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Barone proposes a theory of war influenced by marginalist theory and 
Prussian military thought which is critical of historical determinism and 
includes the belief that the main reason of social evolution is the search 
for power. 




If we look at the way in which studies focusing on military history or 
analysing the military in a more general sense are received in Italy, the picture 
which emerges is not promising.  
From a methodological point of view, we can say that military studies 
develop along three lines: the first focuses on the struggle between nations in a 
political and diplomatic sense, and does not require particular military skill; 
the second, or histoire bataille, is more technical and generally left to 
members of the military; the third is a study of military institutions, their 
dealings with countries in times of peace and war and their internal dynamics. 
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This sort of analysis is generally left to sociologists and researchers in a 
variety of subjects.   
If the first two can be said to have their own "market", the last, 
increasingly viewed as a "niche" subject for few insiders, produces works of 
high value which are largely ignored by the media and public opinion, 
unaccustomed as they are to deal with the subject of defence, the military 
readiness of a country and the economics of war. It can be argued that Italy, as 
one of the major world players in an economic and military sense, should 
tackle these subjects in the same way as they are in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
where the leading national newspapers run articles on military policy and 
discuss changing military doctrines without fear of sounding politically 
incorrect.  
Italy, however, is home to authors who examine military institutions, their 
theorists and the relations between military and civil society but remain largely 
ignored. Consequently, observations and intuitions that might be useful to the 
country are not shared with political decision-makers, who are increasingly 
geared towards choosing short-term measures over wide-scale strategic 
policies.  
This is the case of a volume by Catia Eliana Gentilucci, researcher in the 
history of economic thought at the University of Camerino, entitled "Defence, 
security and economics. Enrico Barone and the war between logic and 
emotion"3, in which she performs an in-depth review of the writings of Enrico 
Barone, a member of the Italian High Command who was a gifted military 
historian, economist and sociologist. A truly eclectic individual who was also 
one of the most interesting military theorists of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century and whose writings, in particular, stressed the importance of 
overcoming the above-mentioned division between military and civil life in 
the hope that the military, cultural and social spheres of life in their various 
components (above all economic) would become more closely connected.  
Enrico Barone (1859-1924) voluntarily took his leave from the Army after 
being promoted to the rank of Colonel. Though he was an able teacher, serving 
in the main military academies as well as being one of the foremost Italian 
scholars of military matters, he is known to national and international literature 
almost exclusively as a neoclassical economist; a unique member of the 
military, equipped with “two souls”: the soldier by training and profession, the 
economist by vocation.  
As a soldier he is a source of precious ideas and insights on the subject of 
war. His theories were well-ahead of their time, inspired as he was by von 
Clausewitz, a figure he was aware of well before the Italian translation of Vom 
Kriege was published in 1942. In fact, when Barone becomes professor of 
Military Science at the War College, Turin, in 1887, he publishes his "Lezioni 
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di Arte Militare" (Lessons on military strategy). This work is inspired by 
Clausewitz’s On War and it shows the strong influence of the Prussian military 
tradition on his military theories on war and, subsequently, the economic and 
social theories that will become his main focus.  
It is clear from a study of his military analyses that Prussia’s military 
victories did not depend on a superior military technology, nor on the 
increased aggressiveness of its soldiers, but instead could be seen in the 
intellectual capacity of the military tool to obey a clear political mandate 
within a command system founded on the autonomy and accountability of the 
officer corps, as well as the ability to rapidly adapt to unpredictable events on 
the battlefield. 
These considerations have found little acknowledgement from the world 
of Italian politics, which has not always seen the military complex as a "tool" 
to be utilised responsibly in foreign policy.  This can help us understand why, 
in the last century, Italian military history has been so troubled starting from 
the first Libyan campaign. In this case, the government only informed the 
Chief of Staff of the Army of their decision to proceed with the campaign one 
month before it was due to commence.  
As he was aware of the fact that the Army had already planned for 
overseas operations, Prime Minister Giolitti thought that briefing General 
Pollio on starting the campaign by September was a mere formality, and this 
speaks volumes on the consideration politicians had for the difficulties that had 
to be overcome during a military campaign.  
A few years later, Marshal Cadorna was not given any information, nor 
allowed to have his say, on the methods and schedule of Italian intervention in 
the European (First World) war. At the outbreak of hostilities in Europe he 
hastened to show the King the plans for Italy’s participation in the war of the 
Triple Alliance, of which Italy was a member. These involved sending some 
divisions to the German army as reinforcements, but Cadorna was taken by 
utter surprise when a declaration of neutrality was issued a few days later.  
During the meeting with the Italian Prime Minister which he immediately 
requested, Cadorna instinctively knew that he should start thinking about 
planning a war against long-standing enemy Austria, though he received no 
formal communication about it. This shows the notable lack of harmony 
between Government and military authorities in an extremely delicate moment 
for the country. A lack of harmony which was to continue, as the Government 
chose to cultivate contacts with the warring parties in secret, leaving the 
military leaders, who should have been responsible for managing the war, in 
the dark. Political conduct and military conduct, instead of communicating as 
they should have, were likecompletely watertight compartments, as if 




The gulf between politics and the military was harmful during the Second 
World War, too, starting with the choice of when to join the hostilities. 
Mussolini actually declared war on France and Great Britain on 10 June 1940, 
even though General Graziani had confirmed a piece of intelligence some 
months earlier, in April: the Italian Armys’ current state of readiness stood at 
40%. The politician decided to take a risk in military matters, a field in which 
technical considerations should have taken precedence, as the level of military 
readiness was so low.  
Barone’s idea of the need for more communication between the political 
and military worlds has, therefore, been observed in military events of the past, 
with consequences we know all too well.  
The need for integration should be considered by present-day politicians, 
too, seeing as troops are often sent to crisis areas without the necessary 
mandate from Parliament being clear; this happens because political forces 
tend to be split according to electoral requirements and when the time comes 
to make difficult decisions the ground commander, not having the unanimous 
backing of Parliament and the nation, is often under great pressure.  
Some blame can surely be laid on the inefficiency and impossibility of 
military leaders to adapt quickly to changing situations, but what has been 
lacking in the past and is lacking still is the autonomy and accountability 
mentioned by Barone. A telling example of this is offered by the “caveats” 
limiting rules of engagement during missions, forcing the commander to bow 
down to political requirements without necessarily considering that this could 
be counter-productive for military operations. 
This link between the political and military world recurs often in Barone’s 
thinking, sure as he is that historical, economic and military events should be 
analysed in such a way as to reveal their interconnectedness in order to choose 
the most effective decision-making processes for politics.  
These ideas are visionary and contemporary, as are his considerations on 
the nature of war, which he expresses in the following sillogism: “War is a 
terrible thing; 2. War is fatal, immanent; 3. One must therefore prepare 
carefully in order to be able to do it well”. 
Of all Italian Twentieth century scholars, Barone anticipates a view of war 
as the immanent image of the evolution of the history of civilisations, and in 
his interpretation war becomes morally instructive, a time in which virtue, 
namely the faculties of the soul like courage, audacity, boldness and sacrifice, 
is exalted, while he sees no guarantee that peace brings economic equilibrium 
and social well-being. However, he states that if peace is desired, it must be 
supported by using arms; sustained, that is, through an economic effort which 
finances military equipment which has the dual goal of deterrence and 
dissuasion. A nation cannot set off on the road towards eternal peace unarmed, 
and waiting until it is too late to start making preparations for war is 
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unadvisable: forces and economic resources must already be deployed in times 
of peace.  
Consequently, if Barone in his "military" incarnation views social 
evolution as being influenced by situations of conflict or periods of armed 
peace, Barone the "economist" perceives two distinct types of economics: the 
economics of war, in which the state submits its industry to an organised 
system in order to satisfy the requirements of war, and military economics, 
understood as a form of political economy implemented by a country in times 
of peace in order to ensure that defence and internal security are upheld. 
In substance, the financial costs of war and maintaining a military force 
are necessary for Barone; therefore, the legitimacy of military costs and wars 
is not called into question, but how to best employ military institutions and the 
army within a normal national policy is fundamental. In this aspect, too, he is 
just as relevant to modern culture. 
His studies on economics contain another important consideration, and 
one which is emphasised very well by Gentilucci.  
In Barone’s words, "it is often to be observed in the history of thought: 
nordic theories, children of the snow, descend triumphant to Italy, only to 
dissolve in the ardent rays of our logic".  
That is to say that applying economic and social models in places which 
are foreign to the culture that generated them is never easy. The idea that an 
economic model created in a particular historical context cannot be applied in 
the same way in another cultural milieu is entirely relevant, seeing as one of 
the main criticisms of Europe has been the unconditional application of the 
German model of economic logic to all national economies, independently of 
their historical traditions.  
The basic problem of the Europe of today is, in fact, that the 
Mediterranean (Spanish – Italian) social model is very different to the German, 
and politics should take that into account and act accordingly.  
The author reflects a great deal on Barone’s world, which is 
interdisciplinary and removed from the economic dogmas that were shared by 
the orthodox academia of his time, and she is right to conclude that «war is 
part of the social system, an ever-present and active aspect of human 
relations, it pushes relations between State and individual to the extreme, it is 
the fight for survival and economic conquest, reason and emotion, 
impulsiveness, built into the evolution of civilisations, a clash of ideologies 
and fight for power. It is, in short, a complex problem which must be tackled 
with all available instruments of analysis, economic, sociological, historical 
and military, in times of peace».  In essence, analysing war exclusively in the 
confines of military or economic thought is limiting and Gentilucci, in 




We hope that this type of study on war and peace does not come to 
nothing, as studies of a military and sociological nature have shown us that 
war events are an integral part of the system and have applications in fields 
other than geopolitical.  
It is hoped that Gentilucci’s studies on this subject might be pursued and 
that the political world realises that Italian military thought can be innovative 
and worthy of consideration.  
 
